REPORT – THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOURS – WHAT KIND OF PARTNERSHIP?

WORKSHOP REPORT

 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOURS –

WHAT KIND OF PARTNERSHIP?

 Introduction

 This is the report of a workshop that took place on 26 February 2010 at the European Studies Centre, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, under the auspices of the European Studies Centre and the Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre, on the subject of the newly launched Eastern Partnership initiative of the European Union.  The workshop was organised by Graham Avery, John Beyer and Jonathan Scheele.

 The workshop involved both academics and practitioners, and was organised in three sessions, covering the following areas: the EU perspective, how it is perceived and how it fits with other policies; the Eastern Partnership as seen by other actors in the region; and where the Eastern Partnership leads and how we get there.

 The following report is a summary of the proceedings of the three sessions of the workshop. In Annex I, the full programme of the workshop can be found. In Annex II, a full list of participants is included and in Annex III the CVs of the speakers. Finally, in Annex IV, a copy of the speech of Mr. Vadym Triukhan, director of the Coordination Bureau for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, at the second session of the workshop is reprinted with his permission.

 Setting the scene

 The Eastern Partnership, involving the European Union and six of its Eastern neighbours (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) was launched in May 2009 as a development of the preceding European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The enlargement of the EU towards the East in 2004 and 2007 created a new set of challenges which these policies aim to address. How should the EU establish an inclusive relationship with the states that remain outside it, allowing them to share in the Union’s values and policies and avoiding the development of new, potentially disruptive fault lines in Europe? How can the success of the pre-accession model be replicated for neighbouring countries whose prospects for membership are unclear? This workshop aimed to find some answers to these questions.

 The EU perspective: how is it perceived? How does it fit with other policies?

 In this session the EU’s motives for launching the Eastern Partnership as well as its instruments in achieving its objectives were examined. Potential conceptual and methodological problems with the policy, notably the ambiguous use of the term ‘partnership’, and the problematic EU conception of itself as a ‘normative actor’ were pointed out. Finally the role and perceptions of the most important ‘3rd state’ in the region, Russia, were examined.

 EU strategy and objectives

 The main strategy behind the ENP and the Eastern Partnership is for the EU to promote security and prosperity for itself and its neighbours through the export of internal EU policies and the encouragement of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The added value of the Partnership to the ENP is a more ambitious approach, stemming from the realisation that the Eastern neighbours face greater challenges in building viable states and maintaining their territorial integrity than former EU accession countries, that their ‘European choice’ is not to be taken for granted, and that the EU has direct interests, for instance in the area of energy security, in establishing good relations with these states.

 The main tools of the Partnership remains the same as for the ENP: conclusion of association agreements; establishment of deep and comprehensive free trade areas; visa liberalisation plus examination of potential for labour mobility; cooperation on energy security; and finally cooperation on regional development policies.

 There was consensus that the Eastern Partnership is a welcome upgrade to the ENP in logistical terms, especially in its introduction of a multilateral facet to integration, alongside the pre-existing bilateral one.  There was also a welcome for its focus on four key thematic platforms of political, economic, energy security and civic reforms, and the inclusion of countries such as Belarus which have so far lacked structural relations with the EU.

 The main debate arose over the real substance of the Partnership policy, centring especially on the question of how the idea of ‘partnership’ is defined and what implications this has. It was pointed out that the values and policies promoted by the EU are almost exclusively its own, which is at odds with the idea of joint ownership and shared values inherent in the idea of partnership. This EU-centred normative agenda, coupled with horizontal and vertical discrepancies in the EU’s foreign policy formulation, risked jeopardising both the effectiveness of the Eastern Partnership and the EU’s role as a ‘force for good’ in international affairs. The counter-argument held that the partnership is indeed a voluntary one: the partners desire to come closer to EU standards, but not that the EU come closer to theirs, therefore that is the approach that is taken.

 The question of conditionality in the absence of a perspective of membership and given the lack of guarantees on access to internal market was discussed. Despite the acknowledgement that the more there is on offer, the easier it will be for countries to carry out often costly reforms, it was felt that the presence of an accession project or potential date was not crucial to the countries’ reform processes. Conditionality itself is a political process, not a mechanical one, and the countries’ self-interest ultimately decides what reforms they will implement.

 Russia‘s role

 Substantial attention was paid to the issue of Russian attitudes towards the Partnership. Russia’s importance for the success or failure of the Partnership cannot be understated. Its role in issues of security, energy supply, and sovereignty of the partnership countries is crucial. However, Russia is not even mentioned in the Partnership treaty, a fact used  by many in Moscow to illustrate their thesis that the Eastern Partnership is an attempt by the EU (“prompted by the anti-Russian Poles”) to extend its ‘sphere of influence’ into traditionally Russian areas in a continuation of the zero-sum game of the Cold War. Russia has thus launched a counter-attack, using both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power elements such as visa liberalisation, strategic trade embargoes, ‘passportisation’ of Russian minorities and setting up of media institutes to increase Russian influence.

 The counter-argument was that the Russian state of mind was a domestic Russian issue, not a reaction to EU activities; the Eastern partners have freedom to choose in their foreign policy and that the situation is not a ‘win-lose’ one between the EU and Russia but rather a ‘win-win’ situation for all concerned. The EU recognises that Russia has certain links to the region giving it great influence, for instance language, military presence, shared history and economic links. What the EU has to offer as a complement to this is a viable socio-economic model of prosperity. The choice to implement this socio-economic model, as noted above, is not a given. One participant, quoting Dov Lynch, suggested that from the point of view of the partners, “the Russians give you an offer which you cannot refuse, the EU gives you an offer that you cannot understand”. However, the potential is there for the Eastern Partnership to become a model of dialogue, perhaps in conjunction with initiatives such as the Euro-Atlantic Strategic Initiative proposed by President Medvedev. Crucially, the Russians must be involved.

 The question of contradictory policies of EU member states was raised, specifically referring to recent discussions between France and Russia on the export of powerful weapons systems. This gap in the EU’s security policy means that members can influence the ‘hard’ security of the Eastern partners. The Lisbon Treaty is meant to address some of these inconsistencies, but member states are wary of giving up their independence in such issues.

 The session showed that behind the technocratic facade of the Eastern Partnership, there are a number of crucially important issues such as security, territorial integrity and state sovereignty which have to be addressed for the Partnership to become properly effective.

 The Eastern Partnership as seen by other actors in the region

 This session focused on the Partnership as perceived by actors in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Caucasus. The main themes were those of the differences of development and approach in the different countries, as well as the previously covered theme of the ambiguity of European integration.

 The Eastern Partnership, to an extent like the ENP, might be trying to do too much in too many places with too little. The different circumstances of the Caucasus countries to the East European trio were pointed out. There are also significant differences between the three East European countries, with Ukraine and Moldova fairly united behind the need for integration with Europe, but with Ukraine much further along the path of reforms, whereas this is the first time Belarus is participating in any EU-led policy.

 A common problem in the countries closest to the EU, Ukraine and Moldova, is the difficulty of ‘selling’ European integration to the population in the absence of EU membership promises. It is therefore important that the EU becomes more visible in these countries, showing the population that they benefit from integration even if the ultimate goal of membership is at present a fairly distant one.

 The point was raised that the EU is a moving and evolving target to integrate with: the ENP and the Eastern Partnership seem to be works in progress while the final offer to its neighbours is worked out within the EU itself, where current crises such as the debate over the EU constitution/Lisbon Treaty, as well as economic problems and the accession process of Turkey complicate any enlargement debates.

 Ukraine – “Knock and the door will be opened”?

 From Ukraine’s point of view, the process of EU integration has come a long way in the last five years, with advances being made in association negotiations as well as sectoral integration. The global economic crisis has been a hindrance lately, and sensitive issues such as visa liberalisation require a constructive approach from both sides. The Eastern Partnership is seen as an important tool of European integration and an improvement on the disliked ENP, but it still seems more like a “strengthened technical aid programme” than a comprehensively changed approach.

 There was consensus that Ukraine will most likely be either an EU member or strategically very close to it in the future. The nature and the timing of the association depends, apart from the internal EU situation, on geopolitical developments and the attitude of Russia (there was disagreement on whether Russia was comfortable with Ukraine’s prospects for integration or not), the state of the Ukrainian economy, and on what Ukraine can offer the EU. For the time being, Ukraine is looking for quality over speed in its negotiations with the EU, specifically for a guarantee on potential membership in the future, and to see the Eastern Partnership lead to more action and less rhetoric. A participant from Ukraine quoted from the priest’s words at evensong in Oxford’s Christ Church Cathedral “Knock at the door and it shall be opened unto you”. Ukraine had knocked at the EU’s door too many times, now it had to make itself attractive to the EU and the door would hopefully open.

 Finally, in response to a question as to which EU members actually want Ukraine to join, it was pointed out that there are 11 countries within the EU advocating Ukrainian membership. For countries such as Poland and Hungary this is a rational decision based on their national interests: Ukraine would partly take over from them the handling of the EU’s external borders. Moreover, according to the basic text of the EU Treaty, “any European state may apply” for membership.  Assuming Ukraine is seen by all Member States as being a European state, it may at any time exercise this right of application. Unfortunately for Ukraine, the EU’s enlargement policy is currently obstructed by the difficult question of Turkey (Turkey and Ukraine are the only large states contending for membership). Until the Turkish membership question is resolved in one way or the other, the way will not be clear for the EU to consider rationally the case of Ukraine. In the meantime, the conclusion of an Association Agreement with the EU is a wise and practical aim for Ukraine, as it goes a long way towards membership.

 Moldova – “There is a green hill far away”?

 The new, younger generation Moldovan government is more positive to the Eastern Partnership than the communist government it replaced. If the new coalition manages to stay in power, it is bound to be disappointed with the pace and scale of EU integration, with the desired association agreement being at least 2-3 years away. EU visibility, as mentioned above, is therefore crucial.

 Belarus – “The first shall be last, the last shall be first”?

 The participation of Belarus in the Partnership was seen as positive, although doubts remain as to the depth and robustness of European orientation in Belorussian circles. Increasing Russian pressure on the country and the negative effects of the global economic crisis have led Belorussian leaders towards a diversification of their foreign policy with more involvement with Western institutions in general. Despite the pragmatic assertion that it still has no desire for EU membership, the participation in the Partnership is a symbolic first for Belarus which might in the long run have increased positive effects.

 The Caucasus

 Regarding the Caucasus countries the verdict was that a decentralised policy would be better than a ‘catch-all’ Partnership. The main problem of the Caucasus countries is the conflict between self-determination of ethnic minorities and the principle of state sovereignty, and the security problems and instability this conflict creates. The EU is seen as having too few tools and giving offers that are too vague as to its main benefit – the move beyond the nation state into a unified structure -to have any real influence on the countries in the region.

 Poland

 Poland sees itself as playing a special role within the EU as promoter of an Eastern policy. This is natural given Poland’s current territorial arrangement, bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, as well as due to cultural and historical ties. Because the Eastern Partnership does not put any offer of membership on the table, it is not satisfactory for Poland, which is worried that Ukraine might reject the EU if the latter waits too long in offering it membership. A different solution, perhaps a ‘political membership’, entailing a higher level of integration than the Partnership, might be thought of as a short-term or medium-term perspective for a country with the size and importance of Ukraine. As a member of NATO and the EU, Poland is no longer as dependent on a free Ukraine as before for its security, but it is in its self-interest to see Ukraine become a part of the EU.

 Where does it lead and how do we get there?

 This session examined the ‘sector by sector’ approach to increased integration, as well as looking at the longer political perspective of the process.

 There is a long history of a ‘sectoral’ approach to EU integration and expansion, including for instance the extension of the single market in most sectors to EEA countries (which did not stop most of them from eventually seeking to become full EU members). A number of agreements in sectors such as aviation, energy, transport and visa liberalisation are already in place or being negotiated with neighbours, including the Eastern partners.

 The sectoral approach was seen as worth pursuing as part of the EU’s ‘toolkit’ in the East, showing that the EU can put substance into the Partnership, potentially conferring both political, practical, economic and public benefits on the Eastern partners, and bringing them closer to the goal of EU integration in the long run. This incremental, functionalist approach might be better suited for integration than a grand foreign policy design. It is also important not to exclude Russia completely from the process, since this could lead to the establishment of a “technical iron curtain”.

 The main point about the political perspective is that most of the parts in the picture are in constant motion. The situation might look very different in the future depending on the EU’s development, especially concerning the nature of its emergence from its current crisis and individual states’ attitude to further enlargement (following France’s suggestion of referenda on populous states’ accession). Russia’s position is key, but like the EU it might change in the future. Further NATO enlargement would be a harder pill to swallow for the Russians than EU expansion. The US does not have a firm position on expansion, but is concerned about economic stability of the EU and the Euro-zone.

 As regards the Eastern partners themselves, it is vital to remember the differences between them, both in terms of democratic performance, position in the wider security environment and position in the queue for EU membership. Ukraine is a different animal due to its size – allowing Moldova to join would be a “service to humanity” compared to the complexity of Ukraine. In the end it comes down to how much Ukraine is willing to do and whether it can build a domestic coalition for European membership which will last over time. Sooner or later the EU will have to offer a time perspective, which might make the process more acceptable to the population (and to Russia) and thus more manageable.

 Conclusions

 The Eastern Partnership is welcome as a more ambitious policy than the ENP, but its lack of a membership perspective is frustrating to actors like Ukraine and Moldova. Tangible and visible benefits for these countries attributed to their association with the EU are thus important to avoid alienating both elites and the wider population. There are potential problems in the EU’s perceptions of itself vis-à-vis the partners as well as in relation to Russia. Dialogue with Russia is crucial.

 The differences between the partners both in terms of political and economic factors as well as level of their ambition at any given moment for EU integration means that there should not be a ‘one size fits all’ policy: the Eastern Partnership is right to offer variable geometry. While three (Ukraine, Moldova and may be Georgia) are recognisable democracies, the others have a way to go to achieve European norms; four of the six have conflict areas or possible secessionist tendencies. A balance between the multilateral and bilateral aspects of the Partnership will therefore be important. The ‘sectoral’ approach to integration is one part of the integration toolkit which might bring some success.

 In the long run, the position of the partners in relation to the EU will depend on how much all actors are willing to do to achieve greater co-operation. In the session on the EU perspective, one participant quoted the words of a former colleague: “the Irishman in me wants to drink, the Scotsman in me doesn’t want to pay”. As regards the Eastern Partnership, it is to be hoped that both EU member states and the Eastern partners will find that the costs involved are much less than the mutual benefits of integration.

Adrian Rogstad, Rapporteur

Annex I – Programme

 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOURS –

WHAT KIND OF PARTNERSHIP?

26 February 2010

Programme of the Workshop

Place   
European Studies Centre Seminar Room, 70 Woodstock Road, Oxford

Chairman

Graham Avery (European Policy Centre, Brussels and St. Antony’s College)

 1400-1530       The EU perspective: how is it perceived? How does it fit with other policies?

  • Why an Eastern Partnership? How does it relate to other to EU strategy and policies?:  John O’Rourke (European Commission, Brussels)
  • An assessment of the EU’s approach to partnership with its Eastern neighbours: Elena Korosteleva Polglase (Department of International Politics, University of Aberystwyth)
  • Discussant:  Julie Newton (St. Antony’s)

1530-1550       Tea

 1550-1720              The Eastern Partnership as seen by other actors in the region

  • Ukraine: Vadym Triukhan (Director of the Coordination Bureau for European Integration, Ukraine MFA)
  • Panel: Kasia Wolczuk (Birmingham University)

John Beyer (former British Ambassador in Moldova and St. Antony’s College)

Bulent Aras (Visiting Fellow, St. Antony’s College)

Nigel Gould-Davies (former British Ambassador, Belarus)

Nadiya Kravets (St. Antony’s College)

1730-1830       Where does it lead and how do we get there?

  • Creating a sense of regional community on the way– sector by sector?:  Jonathan Scheele (EU Visiting Fellow, St. Antony’s College and European Commission, Brussels)
  • Does the Eastern Partnership satisfy the ambitions of Poland and Ukraine?: Professor Andrzej Podraza (Chair of International Relations, Catholic University of Lublin)
  • The political perspective: Professor Timothy Colton (Director, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University)

1900        Dinner at St. Antony’s College (for invited guests)

The organisers would like to thank the Oxford University Ukrainian Society for its help.

  

Annex II – List of Participants

Othon Anastasakis, Director, SEESOX, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Bulent Aras, Visiting Fellow, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Graham Avery, European Policy Centre, Brussels and St Antony’s College, Oxford

John Beyer, Senior Associate Member, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Rebecca Brubaker, DPhil candidate, Oxford University

Hugh Burton, European Movement

Professor Timothy Colton, Director, Davis Centre, Harvard University

Professor Norman Davies, St Antony’s College, Oxford

The Rt. Hon. Terry Davis, Former Secretary General, Council of Europe

Richard Duployen, European Movement

Laura Gibbs, MA Student, University of Kent

Roy Giles, Senior Member, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Nigel Gould-Davies, Project Director, Strategy Unit, FCO, London

Simone Hueser, Postgraduate student, University of Kent

David Imbert, Trinity College, Oxford

Natalia Ivanilova, OSI/Chevening Scholar, Worcester College, Oxford

Robert Jackson, Former MP and MEP

Caroline Jackson, Former MEP

Tina Jennings, Visiting Fellow, RESC, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Ayse Kadioglu, Visiting Fellow, SEESOX, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Elena Korosteleva, Lecturer in European Politics, Aberystwyth University

Nadiya Kravets, DPhil Candidate, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Robert Kuenne, MA student, University of Kent

Professor Andre Liebich, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Developpement, Geneva

Judith Marquand, Wolfson College, Oxford

Professor David Marquand, Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford

Marija Martisiute, MPhil Student, Wolfson College, Oxford

Professor Alan Mayhew, Sussex University and University of Muenster

Elles Melenhorst, MA Student, University of Kent

Galina Miazhevich, Rothermere American Institute, Oxford

Kristina Mikulova, Nuffield College, Oxford

Professor Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Hertie School, Berlin

Hanna Naatanen, PhD Candidate, London School of Economics

Dr Julie Newton, Visiting Fellow, RESC, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Professor Kalypso Nicolaidis, ESC, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Dr John O’Rourke, Head of Unit, DG for External Relations, European Commission

Jane Osbourne, FCO, London

Jana Pakstaitis, DPhil candidate, European Politics and Society, St Antony’s College. Oxford

Dr Cristina Parau, Post-doctoral Student, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford

Professor Andrzej Podraza, Chair of of International Relations, Catholic University of Lublin

Dr Alex Pravda, Director, RESC, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Tanya Radchuk, Research Assistant, Aberystwyth University

Adrian Rogstad, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Jonathan Scheele, EU Visiting Fellow, ESC, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Tina Schivatcheva, Postgraduate student, Cambridge

Michal Simecka, DPhil Student, Nuffield College, Oxford

Veronika Søreide

Philipp Stollenwerk, MA student, University of Kent

Professor Mario Telo, Institut d’Etudes Europeennes, Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Demetrios Theophylactou, Senior Associate Member, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Vadym Triukhan, Director, Coordination Bureau for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration,

Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine

Sara van den Hof, MPhil student, St Antony’s College, Oxford

Alexander Volsky, DPhil Candidate, University College, Oxford

Sarah Winter, FCO, London

Dr Kataryna Wolczuk, Deputy Director, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, Birmingham University

Katja Yafimava, DPhil Candidate Oxford University Centre for the Environment

Peter Zeniewski, DPhil Candidate, Somerville College, Oxford

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Annex III – CVs of Speakers

 Graham Avery

Graham Avery is Senior Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, Senior Adviser at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, and Honorary Director-General of the European Commission.

 During his career in Brussels in the European Commission (1973-2006) he worked in agricultural policy, foreign affairs, enlargement policy, and the cabinets of the President and other Commissioners. His last post was as Director for Strategy, Coordination and Analysis in the Directorate General for External Relations.

 He has been Secretary General of the Trans European Policy Studies Association, (2006-8), Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute, Florence (2002-3, 2009, 2010), Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, Natolin (2003-5), Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (1986-7) and European in Residence at Canterbury University, New Zealand (2006).

 Dr John O’Rourke

 John O’Rourke was educated at McGill University (B.Sc, 1977) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Ph.D., 1982). Since 1994 he has worked in the external relations services of the European Commission.  Initially his responsibilities concerned Russia and the NIS, and in particular cooperation on energy and nuclear safety issues.  From 1999 to 2004 he was deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Commission in Warsaw, monitoring Poland’s harmonisation with the acquis communautaire and supervising the implementation of EU pre-accession assistance to Poland.  For this work he has been decorated with the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland. After his return to Brussels, he joined the Turkey team dealing with the programming of financial cooperation and the monitoring of Turkish preparations in the areas of regional policy, financial control and budget.

 Since January 2007 he heads the unit for general coordination of the European  Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  He is responsible for the drafting of the European Commission’s annual ENP Progress Reports, and has “held the pen” in the preparation of the Commission’s proposal for the Eastern Partnership.

 Dr Elena Korosteleva-Polglase

Elena Korosteleva is Lecturer in European Politics, University of Aberystwyth, UK.  She holds a PhD degree from the University of Bath, and a PhD equivalent from the Belarusian State University. Before joining Aberystwyth, Elena was a British Academy Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Glasgow. Her main research interests are: Democratisation and government formation; The quality of democracy in Eastern Europe; Democracy promotion and EU’s relations with Eastern Europe.

 The latter aspect forms her current major ESRC-funded research project, to analyse the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership (EaP) in Eastern Europe. Elena has set out to examine the problems for the successful realisation of the ENP, empirically and conceptually, by accounting perspectives of both sides – the EU and East European partner states.

 Dr Julie Newton

 Dr Newton graduated from Princeton in French and Russian literature and languages; she holds a Masters in International Affairs, Columbia and took her doctorate at Oxford.  She has a long association with St Antony’s College. Currently Associate Professor in the Department of International and Comparative Politics at the American University in Paris; she is also Associate Professor of the graduate programme taught jointly by the American University and the Institut Catholique in Paris. She is a Visiting Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Studies Centre at St Antony’s. Her research interest focuses on current Russia-EU relations.

 Vadym Triukhan

 Vadym Triukhan is Director of the Coordination Bureau for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, in the Secretariat of Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine since September 2008.  He has been Deputy Head of the Office of Vice Prime Minister; Deputy Director-General, EU Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Executive Secretary of the Ukrainian delegation on the negotiation with the EU on New Enhanced agreement; Head, Unit for justice, freedom and security, EU Department; Chief advisor, Deputy head of the Department of the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Foreign Policy Directorate-General, Secretariat of the President of Ukraine, and Head, Unit for Legal and Humanitarian Cooperation, EU Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. He graduated from the Institute of Oriental Studies and International Relations “Kharkiv Collogium”, 1997, in international relations. He graduated in public management at The National Academy of Public Administration under the President of Ukraine, 2001.

 Dr Kataryna Wolczuk

 Dr Kataryna Wolczuk is Deputy Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, the University of Birmingham. She specialises in East European politics and has studied the dynamics of state-building in Ukraine, especially constitutional reforms, institutional frameworks, as well as the conception of nationhood and national identity in post-communist Europe. She also conducted research on Ukrainian-Polish relations in the context of EU enlargement and, more recently, on relations between Ukraine and the enlarged EU. She is currently working on relations between the EU and the post-Soviet countries within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership.

  Dr Wolczuk has been recently acting as an expert on the EU Eastern Neighbours to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament.

 John Beyer

 John Beyer has an MA in Chinese Studies from Cambridge.  He was Director of the China-Britain Business Council before joining the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1999.  He was UK Ambassador to Moldova 2006-9. He is currently a Senior Associate Member of St Antony’s College. His research interests include: Moldova, Eastern Partnership, conflict resolution: Transnistria, Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia.

 Dr Bulent Aras

 Dr. Bulent Aras is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Istanbul Technical University. He is also coordinator of foreign policy studies at the Ankara based think-thank, SETA and works at the Strategic Research Center of the Turkish MFA. He received his BA in Political Science and International Relations from Bogazici University, and his Ph.D. in International Relations from the same university in 1999. He was visiting scholar at Indiana University’s Center for Eurasian Studies in 1998, Oxford University’s St.Antony’s College in 2003 and was a research scholar at the Paris-based European Union Institute of Security Studies.

 He serves on the editorial boards of Turkish Studies, Journal of Balkans and Near Eastern Studies, Alternatives:Turkish Journal of International Relations, and Central Asia/Caucausus.   His research interest has so far focused on Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern Politics, Central Asia and Central Asian expert. 

 Dr Nigel Gould-Davies

 Dr Gould-Davies has a PhD from Harvard.  He was a lecturer in politics at Oxford 1996-2000.  From 2003-7,  he was Head of Economic Section in the British Embassy in Moscow and was UK Ambassador to Belarus 2007-9.  He is currently Project Director, Strategy Unit Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

 Nadiya Kravets

 Nadiya Kravets holds a BA from San Francisco State University, and an MPhil from Oxford.  Her interests are in: Russian and East European Studies, Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy, Ukraine’s Security and Defence.  She is a tutor at Hertford College and Mansfield College. Her DPhil topic is the Domestic Sources of Ukraine’s Policy towards Russia 1991-2009.

 Jonathan Scheele

 Jonathan Scheele is the first European Union Visiting Fellow at St Antony’s College, for the academic year 2009/2010.  A graduate in Mechanical Sciences and Economics from Trinity Hall, Cambridge, he has been a European Commission official since 1974.  During that time he has worked in a wide range of policy areas, including industrial policy, relations with southern Europe and, later, with South East Asia, international trade negotiations – with a period as European Community negotiator for trade in services (GATS) – and in international transport relations.  From 2001 to 2006 he was the Head of the European Commission’s Delegation in Romania, before returning to Brussels as Director responsible for Transport Infrastructure Networks and Smart Transport.

During his time at the European Studies Centre he is researching into the lessons to be learnt from the development of the different elements of the single transport market, from a political, legal and technical viewpoint, with the aim of extending the single market to future candidate countries as well as those in the EU’s near neighbourhood.

 Professor Andrzej Podraza

 Andrzej Podraza holds the Chair of International Relations in the Institute of Political Science at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland.  After taking a PhD in sociology, he went on to a post-doctoral degree in Political Science at Lublin.  He has been a visiting postgraduate student at St Antony’s College, Oxford, and an academic visitor at Chatham House, Leuven, Philadelphia, Umea and Trnava.

 Andrzej’s main research areas are: European integration (mainly Treaty reforms of the European Union, external relations of the EU, Common Foreign and Security Policy including European Security and Defence Policy, Eastern policy of the EU); international security (especially NATO and the EU); Central and East European countries (especially foreign and security policy); and the foreign policy of Poland.  He is the author of six books, the latest one of which, published in 2007, deals with the EU Treaty reform process.  He has edited seven books over the last four years, all focusing on Polish-Ukrainian and EU-Ukrainian political and economic relations.

 Professor Timothy Colton

 Professor Colton is Morris and Anna Feldberg Professor of Government and Russian Studies and Director of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard. He holds a PhD from Harvard. His research interests include: Russian and post-Soviet government and politics.

 

Annex IV – Speech of Mr. Vadym Triukhan

 Address by Vadym Triukhan

Director of the Coordination Bureau for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration

Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine

 Dear  Chairman,

Ladies and Gentlemen!

First of all, I would like to welcome all the participants of this very important and timely workshop. I’d also like to thank Ambassador Mr John Beyer and Mrs Anzhela Yevgenyeva, president of the Oxford University Ukrainian society and my good friend for their kind invitation to speak in front of such a distinguished audience. This is an excellent opportunity to present you my expert vision of the main results, tasks and perspectives of Ukrainian European integration policy.  I am also glad to discuss the way of implementation of the Eastern Partnership initiative, which since last year has become an important part of the European integration of our country. Apart of that it is time to have first exchange of views on the question “Whether the European integration policy of Ukraine could be revised after Presidential elections in Ukraine?”

Dear friends!

Let’s speak now about current state of play in Ukraine – EU relations.

1) The World financial crisis negatively affected both the EU and Ukraine. It’s obvious that full implementation by Ukraine of all obligations on its way to the EU were also affected by that crisis. At the same time, despite the negative tendency in Ukrainian economy and some slowing down of reforms last two years have seen the most successful and dynamic stage in the relations with the European Union not only from the point of view of intensity but also the achieved progress. Maybe this statement sounds strange but this is a reality.

On another hand, the EU faced also many challenges inside which had some reflections on Ukraine’s European aspirations. First of all, I mean process of fundamental transformation of the EU which put Union into period of uncertainty for a few years. It is my pleasure today to welcome the Lisbon Treaty in force. In my opinion, the process of institutional transformation of the EU will be finalized soon and the EU will become dynamic and open to the integration prospects for other European countries again. 

2) In 2007 Ukraine and the EU launched a new ambitious stage of their relations – negotiations on Association Agreement. Within this process Ukraine will invariably continue deepening of its relations with the European Union. I would like to stress that the recognition of the EU membership prospective in this document is strategically important for our country. No one politician will sign the Agreement which will not provide the Ukrainian society an answer where Ukraine is heading,

Deep and comprehensive free trade area is the most important, however sensitive, part of the Association Agreement. Ukrainian goal here is to get full and fair access to internal market of the EU. Full implementation of four freedoms – free movement of goods, services, capital and labour is a must.

Association Agreement is a high priority task for Ukrainian government and we are expecting to complete all negotiation in the nearest possible future. But as I have already mentioned before we prefer quality to speed and future Agreement will not be concluded at the cost of our national interests. We have no other choice accept of defending Ukraine’s economy within this negotiation process.

3) On the 23rd of November last year EU-Ukraine Association Agenda has entered into force. This document, first time in the history of our relations with the EU, is based on the principles of political association and economic integration, joint ownership, responsibility and monitoring of the results. It is an instrument for preparing of Ukraine for the future Association Agreement implementation as well as a basis for the large-scale national programme of structural reforms in our country.

4) One of the most sensitive issues of Ukraine’s European integration is movement of people. Political and economic integration could not be really effective and fair if there is no integration on the lowest – people’s level. Tough visa regime of the EU towards Ukrainians is one of the obstacles of “Europeanising” of Ukraine. Thereby Ukraine pays high attention to visa issues in our negotiations with the EU. We carry out consultations with the European Commission in order to define criteria and requirements which are necessary for the preparation a ‘roadmap’ towards a visa free regime. Now Ukraine and the EU moved into practical “operational” phase which envisages a detailed analysis by EU experts of the spheres of public order and security, fighting illegal migration, data protection etc. According to the last estimations, this year the “road map” is to be agreed. But we really need here constructive approach from the both sides. I am optimistic here because this way of doing business is most sufficient one. Our Balkan friends have successfully proved it.

5) We also have some positive achievements on sectoral issues:

During the 7th meeting of the Energy Community Ministerial Council on the 18th  of December 2009 in Zagreb (Croatia) the Decision on Ukraine’s accession to the Energy Community was adopted (after the adoption and implementation of the Law on Gaz Market Operation by Ukraine). This Agreement is the best way to reach transparency and compatibility with the EU-standards in the energy sphere.

During the year 2009 intensive results-oriented preparatory work has been done in order to ensure joining of Ukraine to the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E).

The Government pays special attention to the issues of promoting energy efficiency and utilization of renewable energy sources. On the 26th of November 2009 during the International Donor Conference (Stockholm, Sweden) Ukraine announced its decision to join the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership and contribute quite significant amount of money to it.

The negotiations on the Common Aviation space agreement are on the final stage. On the 9th December 2009 the Working Arrangement between the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine and the European Aviation Safety Agency was signed. Now we are working on the implementation of the Working arrangement and harmonization of the national legislation with that of the EU on the air safety as well as on the development of common procedures of certifications in accordance with the special Action plan of the State Aviation Administration for the year of 2010.

These are just a few examples. Much more has been done in other spheres. System of horizontal integration of European integration policy was created, position of the vice-prime-minister on European integration was introduced, Coordination bureau for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, which I have an honour to run, was established etc.

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So, Ukraine is much closer to the EU, than, let’s say, 5 years ago. But now we have even more ambitious agenda for further deepening of our integration to the European Union. If we pass this road successfully, I am sure that Ukraine’s future membership in the EU will be issue just of the technical nature.  Besides, the EU will benefit of it, not just my country.

 

2. Now, let’s move to the Eastern Partnership

It is not a secret that Ukraine perceived European Neighbourhood Policy quite critically. Such an attitude was caused by the substance as well as the name of that policy: Ukraine is not a neighbor of Europe; Ukraine is Europe, whose aspiration is not to be a neighbor of EU, but rather its member. Without mentioning that Ukraine was put in the same basket with such other EU partners like Libya and Palestine. As a result, such a policy could not be really effective.

At the same time Eastern Partnership was a significant step forward as the EU policy towards Eastern Europe and created such conditions when EU Eastern dimension could be better institutionalized, financed, structured and, as a result, more effective. It definitely brought a chance to rethink the current philosophy of cooperation beyond the EU Eastern borders in order to make it mutually beneficial.

Thus, Ukraine considers multilateral level of Eastern Partnership as good potential instrument to bring closer cooperation, development and stability into Eastern European region. In particular, Ukraine is interested in integration of Moldova and Belarus into the European political, humanitarian and economic space. Belarus needs “Europeanization” and Europe needs Belarus being European kind of the state. The Eastern Partnership can greatly contribute here.    

At the same time, Ukraine positively, but rather carefully perceives bilateral level of the Eastern Partnership. In my opinion, it is just an additional mechanism of interactions with the EU in comparison with the existing mechanisms and formats. At the same time, in case of Belarus, this level is desperately needed. Ukraine hopes to get significant added value from the Eastern Partnership for achieving of its Eurointegration goals. I have to admit that there is weak strategic concept of the Program. Majority of its goals in case of Ukraine are being already in the agenda of its relations with the EU. Some of the main Eastern Partnership priorities, which can be considered as strategic for other states of the region, in case of Ukraine are already close to be implemented. 

Political strength and capability of the Eastern Partnership are not obvious too. As for now the Eastern Partnership mostly looks rather as a strengthened technical aid program of the EU then comprehensive “Eastern dimension” of the EU policy.

But anyway Eastern Partnership could be effective mechanism of regional development in the respective countries, could support of the civic society activities, and strengthen capabilities of small business.    

Ukraine backs the initiative and will participate in it until it corresponds with our national interests and speed up our integration to the EU.

We count on positive outcomes of the implementation of some practical programmes:

–      First of all,- Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB) programme which should be focused on capacity building in Ukraine with  the emphasis on the preparation to the future Association Agreement implementation. We are pleased that our EU partners use in the process of developing of this programme principles of joint ownership and responsibility.

–      Secondly, – Integrated Border Management Programme. The ultimate goal of its program is to ensure full compliance of Ukraine’s borders with the EU norms and standards.

–      Thirdly, – energy efficiency and energy security, – no reasons for explaining how important these issue are for both Ukraine and the EU.

–      Forth, – regional projects, prepared in accordance with the EU cohesion policy. In the last years regional issues became sensitive for Ukraine for well-known political reasons. So, involvement and assistance of the EU is very much desirable and Crimean initiative, launched recently by the EU, is a very good example of such wise common actions.

 

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

We know that Eastern Partnership is not a direct way to the EU membership for any partner country, including Ukraine. Moreover, we are sure that majority actions within this policy should be done by ourselves. At the same time we proceed from the understanding that it is a set of additional practical opportunities and instruments the effective use of which allows Ukraine to come closer to its strategic goal.

I personally believe that Eastern Partnership deserves to be a success story. But to achieve this we need,-

First, to implement and further develop it on the basis of recognition of the European identity of all its partners, first of all Ukraine.

Second, to treat it as an additional but not an alternative for enlargement policy tool.

Third, to use both multilateral and bilateral levels of the Eastern partnership with the understanding that we do not replace existing mechanisms and formats.

And last but not least, – we need to follow this principle, – more concrete (specific) actions and programs instead of political statements and empty slogans.

If we jointly will demonstrate ability to follow these principles, Eastern Partnership will really bring added value for both the EU and its partner countries.

 

3. Now let’s move to the most sensitive issue. Whether the European integration policy of Ukraine could be revised after Presidential elections?

Dear colleagues!

I am confident that many of you while thinking about Ukraine and its European perspective wonder how the last Presidential election will influence on the foreign policy of this biggest European state? Will the change of the President of Ukraine lead to revision of its European policy? There are many discussions on these issues all over the Europe. Considering the complexity of the existing analytical forecasts let me reflect on it.

Yesterday, there was inauguration of the new President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, head of state, who, according to the Constitution, has the right to determine the foreign policy course of the state. Presidential campaign is over and according to the international observers, the OSCE and the EU observers in particular, it was recognised as fair and transparent, complying with the European democratic principles and standards. Ukraine has demonstrated its commitments to democracy and European values. Once again.

So, for the question if the European integration remains a priority for the new-elected President? My answer is “yes”. Everybody in our country understands that there is no other better or alternative way for Ukraine than European integration. Ukraine has chosen this strategic priority since the first years of its independence as a road map for internal transformations, democratisation, building market-oriented economy and introducing European standards of life for its citizens.

Ukrainian legislation firmly determines European integration as a backbone of the state, both internal and external, policy. From year to year Ukrainian economy becomes more and more integrated into European markets. Today our business sector has no future for further development without economic integration and free trade area with the EU. However, I have to admit that business didn’t have this understanding 3-5 years ago.

I’d like to underline that whoever would become the President this time and whoever will become the President in the future it will be impossible to stop European integration. Every responsible Ukrainian politician understands that European integration is a core stone for strengthening and development of our country. I am sure that President Yanukovych is such a responsible politician, who realises that accession to the EU is for Ukraine the best way for protection of its national interests, insuring economic development and strengthening of the state as democratic one.

Moreover we should remember that incumbent Government of Ukraine which is strongly pro-European is continuing fulfilment of its obligations in particular in the sphere of European integration.

So, I am deeply confident that the “revision” of the foreign policy of Ukraine is impossible. Ukraine’s strategic priority has been chosen, – a full membership in the EU.

At the same time, in my opinion, some “adjustments” to our Eurointegration policy are definitely needed. Ukraine is going to improve the quality of its integration policy in order to make it more effective and pragmatic.

We realise that it’s necessary to make process of the European integration less politicised both internally and externally. Our country will work harder on the way of appropriate transformations in Ukraine and approximation to the European standards. Moreover, we must protect our own national interests. High quality of our integration is more important rather then speed. In order to prove that, I would like to quote Mr Yanukovych’s position which he made public in the interview for “The Wall Street Journal” last week: “If we hope to join the European Union we must secure political stability and establish ourselves as an economically viable nation. We must be pragmatic and focused to achieve EU membership. We must create transparent policies that allow our economy to thrive and demonstrate that Ukraine will add value to the EU as a new member state… If we hope to join the EU and raise the standard of living of Ukrainians to that of other European nations, we must restore our economy from within”.

I can not avoid mentioning other issue of sensitive character. Probably some of you have already heard widely spread rumours on Ukraine’s possible joining the Common Economic Space (CES) with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Let me be clear on this point. Obviously, we will take some concrete steps towards closer cooperation with that community. We do not have other choice since they are our traditional partners. But Ukraine will correlate its steps in this direction with European integration priorities. I have to state: in case of Common Economic Space the creation of the free trade area is the final goal of integration but in case of the EU, free trade area is just the beginning.

By the way, it’s expected that President of Ukraine Mr V. Yanukovych will pay his first foreign visit to Brussels. It could be considered as a political signal that European integration remains Ukrainian priority. Another option, – to visit Moscow first. At the same time, it worth to underline that sense of foreign policy lies not only in the destinations of the visits, but in the concrete steps and practical achievements.   

I would like to add one more political aspect. We realise that today Ukraine should develop more balanced multilevel relations with the West. Lobbying the Ukraine’s perspective membership in the EU shouldn’t be performed via Brussels exclusively. Ukraine needs more close bilateral cooperation on European integration issues with practically all the EU member-states, especially with Germany, France and Great Britain.

Full-fledged dialogue with European capitals at all levels should be updated and upgraded immediately. I am convinced that the main road of the European integration policy of Ukraine lies exactly through the bilateral dialogue with the European states, not only through participation in the projects of “Brussels bureaucracy”.

Apart of that, we understand that the level of cooperation with European Parliament, which influence and power have become much stronger with adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, should be strengthened and raised. I believe that this public body of the EU has ever bigger potential in supporting Ukraine. By the way, yesterday’s resolution of the European Parliament on Ukraine is very good proof of this statement.

And finally, last but not least, integration of my country to the EU lies also through results-oriented relations of Ukraine, without even mentioning our strategic partner Russia, with other global players such as US, China, Japan, India, Brazil etc.

  

            Ladies and Gentlemen,

Yesterday, during the evensong in Christ Church Cathedral in this lovely city of Oxford, I was listening to the very simple words of the priest, – knock at the door and the door will be opened to you. One thought came into my mind. Ukraine was knocking at the EU door too many times. Now the times come to stop knocking and to finally make Ukraine attractive for the EU, and then this door will be widely opened for us. Let’s do it together.

Thank you for your attention!

 

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